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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET C. SARTAIN 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.-
'ri~~RNON C. SARTAIN 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Complaint and counter-claim for divorce both based 
on the grounds of mental cruelty. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint 
and e:nvarded defendant a divorce on his counter-claim. 
The trial court further denied plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this brief the parties will be referred to as they 
appeared in the trial court. The Statement of Facts as 
given in the plaintiff's brief presents only that testi-
mony which is most favorable to her position. Since the 
case is equitable in nature and the court has the power 
to review the evidence, there follows a statement and dis-
cussion of pertinent testimony necessary to complete a 
review of the evidence in this case. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Rupert, 
Idaho on October 18, 1942 (R. 60). Four children were 
born as issue of this marriage and the plaintiff had an-
other daughter from a prior marriage who was adopted 
by the defendant (R. 60). The parties had lived together 
as man and wife for almost twenty years when this ac-
tion for divorce was filed by the plaintiff. Defendant 
counter-claimed and the trial court, sitting without a jury, 
granted a judgment for divorce on defendant's counter-
claim and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint (R. 158). 
Testimony given at the trial shows that during the 
course of the marriage, plaintiff had on several occasions 
made major economic commitments for the family with-
out first consulting defendant or obtaining his consent. 
Plaintiff arranged for the purchase of a car in the fall of 
1961 that did not contain the features which the defend-
ant desired it to have (R. 135-136). This transaction 
was completed by the plaintiff signing the defendant's 
name to the contract (R. 136). Approximately a year 
and a half prior to the institution of this action the 
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plaintiff without consulting the defendant purchased a 
lll'W ~tovp (R. 136-137). The same is true of the purchase 
of a n'frig-crator by the plaintiff (R. 137). Testimony was 
al~o g-ivPn to show that plaintiff had incurred several 
tleht~ without defendant's knowledge (R. 101, R. 137). 
Plaintiff refused to have sexual relations with the 
dPfPndnnt for several months prior to the time this action 
for divorr(' was filed (R. 86, R. 142), and only sparingly 
before then (R. 86}. This refusal existed even though de-
t't'tHlant was desirous of having sexual relations and 
attt>mptcd to overcome plaintiff's objections to sexual 
rPiations hr acquiescing to her demands (R. 112, R. 127, 
R. 142). 
The plaintiff criticized the defendant in many ways 
and ridiculed his idea.s (R. 143-144). Plaintiff refused to 
let ddendant make an addition to the garage (R. 143-
144), or put in a garden behind the house (R. 73, R. 87-88, 
H. 139). She insisted that he do the yard work even 
though two teenage boys were available to do this work 
and the defendant was working full time (R. 87-88, R. 
139). Plaintiff's criticism of defendant even extended 
to the point of being critical of the amount of food which 
he ate together with claims that defendant was a glut-
ton (R.141). 
The trial of this case took only a. half day and a re-
new of the short transcript is recommended as there 
Pxists a myriad of charges and counter charges too nu-
merous to recite here. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
THE DIVORCE TO DEFENDANT ON HIS 
COUNTER-CLAIM. 
After hearing the testimony, the trial judge felt 
that the parties might be able to effect a reconciliation 
and continued the case for three weeks to see if this was 
possible (R. 154-155). 
At the end of this period, it appeared that no recon-
ciliation was possible (R. 156-157), and grounds for di-
vorce existing, there was no reasonable alternative but to 
grant a divorce. Gra.ziarno v. Grazia;no, 7 Utah 2nd 187, 
321 Pac. 2nd 931. The trial judge gave the defendant a 
divorce on his counter-claim and dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint (R. 158). 
The trial court in awarding the defendant the di-
vorce entered its Findings of Fact and made the follow-
ing statement in paragraph 7 of these findings: 
''For a substantial period of time during the mar-
riage, particularly during the last few months 
thereof prior to the institution of this action, 
plaintiff has treated the defendant cruelly, causing 
him great mental distress by refusing to have sex-
ual relations with him for several months imme-
. dia tely preceding the commencement of this 
action; making major economic commitments for 
the family without consulting with defendant and 
obtaining his consent ; by constantly degrading 
defendant and criticizing his ideas and views and 
making him an object of ridicule in the eyes of the 
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('hildren of the parties and has otherwise so treat-
Pd the defendant that the legitimate objects of the 
marriage have been destroyed and defendant is 
entitled to a decree of divorce from plaintiff on his 
counter-claim.'' (R. 36-37) 
It is clear that the findings of the trial court state 
grounds sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 30-3-1 
(7) U.C.A. 1953, which requires a showing of cruelty 
to the extent of causing great mental distress. 
The record shows that the plaintiff failed to obtain 
the consent of the defendant in the purchase of a stove 
(R. 136-137) and a refrigerator (R. 37). She purchased 
a ear without defendant being present and ignored his 
wishes relating to certain features which he desired the 
car to have (R. 135-136). She overruled his wishes with 
respect to the purchase of the house (R. 138). There was 
also testimony that plaintiff incurred debts on several 
charge accounts without first consulting the defendant 
(R. 137). 
The plaintiff ridiculed the defendant for taking a 
paper route (R. 62), and on occasion refused to give 
him the car keys so that he could deliver his papers 
(R. 82-84). 
Both the plaintiff and defendant testified that the 
plaintiff refused to let the defendant put a garden in 
behind the house (R. 73, R. 87-88, R. 139). The defendant 
testified that the plaintiff told him if he did put in a gar-
den she would refuse to wash his clothes (R. 139). Plain-
tiff criticized the defendant for not keeping up the yard 
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and told him that it was his duty even though he was 
working full time and two teenage boys were available to 
do this work (R. 87-88, R. 139). Plaintiff's criticism of 
defendant extended even to the point of refusing him the 
right to eat breakfast (R. 116, R. 140), and accusing him 
of being a glutton and eating too much (R. 141). 
Probably the most humiliating aspect of plaintiff's 
treatment of defendant was her complete refusal to have 
sexual relations with him for several months prior to the 
time they separated and this action for divorce was insti-
tuted (R. 86, R. 142), and her general reluctance to have 
relations prior to this period (R. 86). 
Defendant's frustration and humiliation was height-
ened by plaintiff's demands that he gargle, brush his 
teeth, and bathe before she would sleep with him followed 
by a refusal to sleep with him even when he had complied 
with these demands (R. 112, R. 127, R. 142). 
Plaintiff's opinion of defendant which she expressed 
to him on several occasions appeared to be one of general 
contempt and ridicule (R. 143, R. 144). 
See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 28 (1). 
The effect that this treatment had upon defendant 
was a welling up of frustration, humiliation, and disgust; 
feelings which anybody under similar circumstances 
would have felt. 
In the case of Stevenson v. Stevenson,. 13 Utah 2nd 
153, 369 Pac. 2nd, 923, this court in describing what con-
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~titutes mental cruelty, pointed out that the determina-
tion to a laq.(P extent turns on the sensibility of the party 
~ulrPring the cruelty. The following wording was used: 
''What constitutes mental cruelty must be ascer-
tained from the facts of each case. Whether de-
fendant's conduct was cruel and whether it caused 
plaintiff to suffer great mental distress can only 
he <lctcrmined in light of the sensibility of this 
particular plaintiff. Persons' sensibilities may 
Yary due to their different degrees of intelligence, 
refinement, delicacy of health, etc. For this rea-
son the same conduct may constitute mental cruel-
tv in one case and not in another. The overall 
r{nswer depends not so much on defendant's con-
duct but rather on the effect such conduct had 
upon the plaintiff.'' 
In this case the record clearly reflects the ridicule, 
humiliation, and frustration felt by the defendant as a 
result of plaintiff's conduct. There should be no question 
but what the trial court had sufficient reason to award 
a divorce to the defendant on the grounds of mental 
cn1elty. 
Although the discretion of the trial court in refusing 
or granting a diYorce is subject to revision on appeal, the 
general rule is that the trial court's judgment in this 
n)spPrt \Yill not be reversed unless it is clearly shown 
that its power has been improperly exercised. 27 A C.J.S. 
Divoree § 194 (5); also Cttrry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2nd 198, 
321 Pae. 2nd 939; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 
5i~i, 236 Pac. 2nd 1066; Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 
511, 212 Pae. 2nd 194. 
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In the Curry case cited above, this court stated thu; 
principle in the following language: 
''The precept is well recognized that the trial 
court is vested with broad equitable powers in di-
vorce matters and that its judgment will not be 
disturbed lightly nor at all unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against his findings, or there 
has been a plain abuse of discretion or a manifest 
injustice or inequity is wrought.'' 
Plaintiff's reliance on the old doctrine as stated in 
the cases of Doe v. Doe (1916), 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781, 
and Hyrup v. Hyrup (1926), 66 Utah 580, 245 Pac. 335, 
that the husband must make a stronger case than the 
wife in order to be entitled to a decree of divorce on the 
grounds of mental cruelty does not appear to be fully 
justified. This doctrine which comes from a more chival-
rous age is based upon the theory that the woman is 
more sensitive than the man and that she is not so well 
able to take life's buffeting. .Alldredge v . .Alldredge, 119 
Utah 504, 229 Pac. 2nd 681. 
In the years since the Doe v. Doe and Hyrup v. 
Hyrup cases this court appears to have moved away 
from this doctrine. In the cases of Lundgren v. Lundgren 
(1947), 112 Utah 31, 184 Pac. 2nd 670, and Wooley v. 
Wooley (1948), 113 Utah 391, 195 Pac. 2nd 743, the court 
acknowledged the existence of the doctrine but then 
went on to support the decree of divorce for the husband 
stating that there may have been circumstances seen by 
the trial judge who was able to see the witnesses which 
may have presented a stronger case for the husband. 
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A more recent opinion dealing with the situation 
wlwn' one party sues for divorce on the grounds of men-
tal cruelty and the other party counter-claims on the 
same grounds is Hendricks v. Hendricks (1953), 123 Utah 
178, 2:J7 Pac. 2nd 366. In this case the trial court had 
refused to grant a divorce to either the wife or the hus-
band on the theory that both were guilty of cruel treat-
ment. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the 
trial court for further proceedings and in so doing used 
the following language : 
'' ... Our policy has been to take into considera-
tion the practical exigencies of such situations 
and in ca.ses such as the instant one, where both 
are at fault, approve the granting of a divorce to 
the one least to blame.'' 
Further in the opinion, the court made this statement : 
''In view of the fact that neither spouse is ac-
cused of the commission of a felony, adultery, or 
any other heinous offense, but the reciprocal 
claims rest upon various acts and omissions, al-
leged to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial 
court would be performing its function in the ad-
ministration of justice by determining which party 
was least at fault, granting a divorce and adjust-
ing their rights giving due consideration to the 
applicable factors outlined in our recent opinion 
of McDonald v. McDonald.'' 
In the Hendricks case there was no mention of the 
doctrine that the husband has the duty of presenting 
a stronger case in order to be entitled to the divorce. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO AWARD THE DIVORCE TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
As was acknowledged in the trial court Findings of 
Facts (R. 36), the defendant's conduct was not always 
exemplary. It appears, however, that most of the conduct 
complained of by the plaintiff was in response to plain-
tiff's treatment of defendant. 
Defendant's use of strong language and flares of 
temper were generally in response to encitement by the 
plaintiff. Examples of this were when she refused to give 
him the car keys so he could deliver his papers (R. 82-84); 
when she refused to let him put in a garden (R. 73-74); 
when she refused to have sexual relations (R. 71, R. 119); 
her objections to his delivering papers to supplement 
the family income (R. 63). 
The accusations of unchastity by defendant were only 
bitter insults incited by plaintiff's refusal to have sexual 
relations with him and his frustration flowing from this 
refusal (R. 119). This is shown in one instance by plain-
tiff's own testimony on pages 70-71 of the record. 
'' Q. Immediately before we filed the complaint 
in June of 1962, were there any incidents -
excuse me - that caused any particular dif-
ficulty between you and your husband~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What~ 
A. He says, 'Why won't you be my wife~' 
10 
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Q. \Vhen was this, and where was this? 
A. This was on numerous occasions in the bed-
room. 
Q. All right. Let's take a specific instance 
when he made that statement. Then what was 
said beyond that ~ 
A. He said, 'You must be getting it from some-
body else because you won't give it to me.' " 
It is possibly true that defendant did not bathe as 
often as plaintiff desired but there is evidence to show 
that he had never bathed more often than once a week 
(H. 111). 
The plaintiff has in Point III of her brief under Sec-
tions D and E listed several charges against the defend-
ant some of which are true but many of which are not 
or deserve amplification. 
The radio referred to by plaintiff was used by the 
defendant to awaken him for his paper route (R. 81). 
(Appellant's brief, Point III, D-1.) 
There was no showing that the paper route did not 
make a profit only the plaintiff's assertion that she never 
saw the money (R. 84). (Appellant's Brief, Point 
III, D-4.) 
Defendant did not refuse to buy the furniture desired 
by plaintiff, but only insisted that he would like to save 
his money so that he could pay cash (R. 75). The record 
reflects that the defendant did supply the household ne-
cessities (R. 75). (Appellant's Brief, Point III, D-5.) 
11 
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The incidents where defendant struck his son were 
both accidents (R. 100, R. 117, R. 118). (Appellant's 
Brief, Point III, E-4.) 
The effect on plaintiff of defendant's actions war-
rants some attention, particularly in light of the defini-
tion of mental cruelty set out in the case of Stevenson v. 
Stevenson, 13 Utah 2nd 153, 369 Pac. 2nd 923. During the 
incident where defendant drove a paring knife into a 
wall and damaged the stove in a demonstration of anger 
(R. 68), plaintiff's response was not one of horror or 
shock as would be expected, but only concern for the loss 
of the knife as seen in this excerpt of testimony on page 
68 of the record : 
"Q. Then what~ 
A. Then he walked into the - he was standing 
in the doorway, and then he turned around 
and grabbed a knife off the table and 
slammed it into the wall and broke the blade. 
I think he may have cut his hand. I don't 
know. So I went into the front room be-
cause I didn't want to listen to him any 
longer, and then he come into the doorway 
between the front room and the kitchen, and 
I said, 'You are going to have to buy me a 
new paring knife. That cost thirty-nine cents. 
Tax makes it forty-one.' I says, 'I need a 
paring knife for all-around purposes, and I 
am just fed up,' and he sat down to the kitch-
en table and started using foul and abusive 
language.'' 
Plaintiff has not shown that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to grant her a divorce on the 
12 
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grounds of mental cruelty. The extent of the trial court's 
discretion is shown in this statement taken from 27 A 
C.J.S. Divorce Section 194 (7): 
•'Unless the decree is palpably wrong or mani-
festly against the weight of the evidence or unless 
the evidence in support of the decree is so slight 
as to indicate an abuse of discretion a decree 
granting or refusing a divorce will not, as a rule 
be disturbed where the record amply supports the 
decree, where the judgment is sustained by com-
petent evidence, or where the evidence is con-
flicting.'' 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
After the judgment was entered plaintiff moved for 
a new trial (R. 43-44). This motion was based on the 
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify the 
judgment of the trial court, Rule 59 (a) (6), U.R.C.P., and 
also that new evidence had been discovered which war-
ranted a new trial. Rule 59 (a) (4) U.R.C.P. 
Generally speaking, a motion for a new trial is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the 
court may exercise considerable discretion in passing on 
the application. Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 Pac. 
2d 1155; McMaster v. Salt Lake Transportation Com-
fWny, 108 Utah 207, 159 Pac. 2d 121; Fuller v. First Se-
curity Bank of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 Pac. 2d 701. 
See also 66 C.J.S. New Trial§ 201 p. 484, et seq. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With respect to the allegations that the evidence of 
the trial was insufficient to justify the verdict, the gen~ 
eral rule is that a verdict will not be set aside on this 
ground if the evidence substantially supports it. People 
v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93,21 Pac. 400; Weber Basin Water 
Conservarncy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 Pac. 2d 
730. The discussion of the facts in Point I in this brief 
adequately shows that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to award a new trial on the grounds 
of insufficiency of the evidence. 
Rule 59 (a) ( 4) U.R.C.P. specifies that in order to 
be entitled to a new trial by reason of newly discovered 
evidence, the new evidence must be material and which 
with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
It is plaintiff's position that a physical condition dis~ 
covered by her following the trial in April, 1963, affected 
her desire and ability to have sexual relations with the 
defendant. For this new evidence to be relevant, it must 
be assumed that this condition substantially affected plain~ 
tiff's desire and ability for sexual relations during the 
period of her refusal which existed for several months 
prior to this action being filed in early June, 1962 (R. 86). 
It must also be assumed that this condition could not 
have been discovered and produced at the trial. 
There is nowhere in the record evidence to support 
either of these assumptions. If it was a physical condi~ 
tion which caused plaintiff's refusal to have sexual rela~ 
tions with the defendant, then surely she would have been 
aware at the time that something was wrong. Yet, a year 
14 
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later at the trial, she testified that she refused to have 
Hexual relations with the defendant because he smelled 
'•like a goat" and she "just wasn't interested" ( R. 86). 
Defendant testified that plaintiff gave him no reason ex-
cept that he needed a bath, a condition which he corrected 
but to no avail (R. 142). The position taken by plaintiff 
that this condition could not have been discovered with 
due diligence during the intervening year before the trial 
iH without support in the record. 
Even if it is assumed that plaintiff's refusal to have 
sexual relations was due to this condition and the condi-
tion could not be discovered before the trial, there is 
ample evidence other than plaintiff's refusal to have 
sexual relations which supports the divorce for defend-
ant. It is submitted that admission of this new evidence 
would not affect the trial court's judgment, and for this 
ieason it is not material. 
When the trial court is faced with either granting or 
denying a new trial by reason of newly discovered evi-
dence, the following rule found in 66 C.J.S. New Trial 
§ 201 (8) p. 500, et seq., is applicable: 
''A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence is addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and the granting or deny-
ing of a new trial applied for on this ground is 
largely discretionary. The mere fact that a new 
trial might have been granted does not mean that 
the court abuses the discretion in denying it.'' 
See also W rilker Bank & Trust Company v. New York 
Terminal Warehouse Company, 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 Pac. 
:2d 626, and Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah, supra. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
In reading the transcript of this case there is one 
note which rises above the welter of recriminatory 
charges and counter-charges. This is the feeling of de-
spair and frustration felt by the defendant; feelings pro-
voked by plaintiff's treatment which included rejection 
in her refusal to sleep with defendant; humiliation 
through ridicule of his ideas and feelings; and disregard 
for his desires. 
It is true that out of this despair and frustration, the 
defendant sometimes exploded in a burst of anger and 
disgust. It is from these incidents plaintiff has taken 
most of the charges upon which her case is based. 
There is adequate evidence to support the trial 
court's judgment of divorce to defendant and the dis-
missal of plaintiff's complaint. For this reason, there 
exists no abuse of discretion and the judgment should 
not be changed. 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial rests on the dis-
covery of a physical condition which it is contended ex-
plains her refusal to have sexual relations with defend-
ant over a year earlier. It is submitted that this con-
dition should have been discovered during the year prior 
to trial if it did affect her ability as contended. 
The trial court's refusal to grant a new trial is within 
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'rhere was no abuse of discretion by the trial court 
and its findings should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. L. DART, JR. 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
17 
Attorney for Defenda.nt 
and Respondent 
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